That the raw data for epistemology consist of uninterpreted and non-intentional experiences was a view developed previously by the sensationists. Again, the insight that when we refer to "objects" in our cognitions, we have already performed a constructive synthesis on the "manifold of our intuitions" had been stated before by Kant--among others. 4 But what makes Carnap's effort unique is that it moves beyond the arguments which claim merely that such construction takes place, and it systematically tries to model this process in a rigorous and formal way. Moreover, it sketches outlines both for modeling the structure of what is created by this synthesis and for representing a set of dynamic procedures by which this synthesis might occur.
In the next few paragraphs I shall endeavor to explain what I mean by this distinction between "structure" and "procedure". Aaron Sloman, a philosopher and researcher in artificial intelligence (AI) at the University of Sussex, elaborates on some motivations for philosophically oriented research in his field:
By trying to turn our explanations and theories into designs for working systems, we soon discover their poverty. The computer, unlike academic colleagues, in not convinced by fine prose, impressive looking diagrams or jargon, or even mathematical equations. If your theory doesn't work then the behaviour of the system you have designed will soon reveal the need for improvement. Books don't behave. We have long needed a medium for expressing theories about behaving systems. Now we have one . . .. Progress in philosophy (and psychology) will now come from those who take seriously the attempt to design a person. 5 Carnap, in his Aufbau, shares intentions very similar to those of Sloman. In effect, he says with this work: "Let us discard pointless discourse on metaphysics, etc., in favour of the designing of actual, sampie constructions which can be tested for their effectiveness".
But there are fundamentally different ways of carrying out, or at any rate describing, such a "design". One of these is the logistic approach, which represents each "construction" or design in the form of a logical representation of a class; w here the logical expression for that class is derivable by standard rules of logic from the primitive "givens"--possibly via intermediate derivations. I call this the "structural" approach because it focuses on the logical structure of the class which is to be constructed. Carnap prefers to rely primarily on such structural representations in his system, since the language of 10gic provides (in virtue of its formal rules and proof-procedures) a seemingly objec-'live basis for the desired independent testing of one's constructions. All other ways of looking at the system, "languages" as Carnap would have it, appear to hirn as useful only for aiding one's intuitive understanding of the concepts involved; and so Carnap treats them as merely convenient auxiliaries to the logic.
Nonetheless, Carnap does take some tinie to develop alternative models for the classes he constructs. He calls these "fictitious operations". In these models, which I would call "procedural", one focuses not on the structure of the derived classes as such, but rather on the procedures by which one could generate these classes given only the primitive data plus all classes already constructed. Ironically, though Carnap objects that these florts of models are not testable in the manner that the logic is, it appears that he never attempts to engage in this testing in earneat. That ia, often in his text, if one were actually to consider a sampIe set of objects in a class and mentally perform the operations upon them which Carnal describes, one would quickly discover that, in fact, they fail to result in classes of the sort allegedly being derived.
To illustrate the distinction between "structural" and "procedural" representations of constructions, consider the twin representations of an assembled radio or uther device which can be found typically in hobbyist magazines: (a) a schematic representation of the fully assembled object vs. (b) a set uf step-by-step instructions for building it. Because Carnap believes that the first approach alone is sufficient, a number of the fictitious operat::ons he describes take on a curious form: "A identifies those classes w~ich satisfy such-and-such logical conditions". Sometimes this sort of eKpression could describe a practicable method (as in "A identifies all cla:ises satisfying the condition of having more than 5 members"), but mOHt often the "operation" as stated is meaningless. Imagine being told that the procedure for building a radio is simply to "identify those sets of components which satisfy the structure of the schematic diagram ". Clearly, no set of components is likely to start out by satisfying those conditions; and what the schematic leaves out is precisely how to cause it to occur that some of them take on that structure.
No map or model is complete in itself, but if these two complementary guides (of "schematic" and logical description and of "building instructions" or prOCf dural model) are used in conjunction, they can often correct each other's weaknesses. If, for instance, the phrasing of an instruction is ambigu(,us, one can look at the schematic to see what is the intended result of the operation. If, on the other hand, the ambiguity lies with the schemhtic itself, one can look to the corresponding steps in the instructions to find out how one ia expected to generate the structure which is illustrated. Just this two-pronged method is implicit in Carnap's foundational outline of the Aufbau. This paper will endeavor to make that method explicit.
As I have suggested, Carnap does in fact represent most of his constructions both in the " sym boUe language of logisties" and also in the "language of fictitiotJs construetive operations" (95) . Yet, because he holda that only the "symbolic language of logistics [especially as developed in Whitehead '8 and Russell's Prineipia Mathematiea] gives the proper and precise expr'ession for the constructions", he numbers the fictitious operations am(lng the three other approaches which "serve only as more comprehensibl,~auxiliary languages" (95). These "other" languages consist of translations of each logical class description (1) into "a simple paraphrase in word language", (2) "into the realistic language customary in the empirical scil~nces", and (3) into the procedural "fictitious operations" of present c(lncern. The latter representations (3) he views merely as devices for facilitating "the intuitive recognition of the formal correctness of the construction (i.e., the testing of whether each constructional definition is . .
• not ambiguous, not empty, and purely extensional)". The paraphrases (1) are geared simply to help the reader follow the logical derivations. Finally, the realistic language (2) is help7ful for "testing the correctness of the eontent of the [constructions] (iee., whether or not the constructional definition actually refers to the familiar object to which it purports to refer)" (95).
In effect, then, this paper takes up the challenge which Carnap poses in his Aufbau--namely, to make of it a basis· for continued epistemological research. In an attempt to revitalize Carnap's effort, the paper tries to "update" his own presentation, to fi11 in same of his text's more obvious gaps, and generally to make at least the first few steps of its constructional outline more accessible to the interested modern reader. For continuity, I retain Carnap's use of the above-mentioned "four languages": and where one of these appears incomplete or ambiguous, I attempt to reconstruct what is missing, and to append needed sections of "Comments", "Notes" , or "Explanations".
Moreover, when the crucial step of constructing "similarity cireIes" is reached, the important contributions of Nelson Goodman to Carnap study are carefully considered. I refer particularly to his "counter example" to Carnap's method in that place, since this is often considered very damaging to Carnap's Aufbau system. It is in that discussion that I describe my working computer prograrrl for constructing similarity cireIes procedura11y; and, in the process, an algorithm which can apparently "sidestep" the import of Nelson Goodman's counter example is examined.
A possible advantage of this exercise is that, hopefu11y, it can counterbalance the view of AI thinkers such as Sloman who believe that a11 attempts at reductionism are "refuted" by AI work. Since, for exampIe, a high level program such as an accounting package can run on any brand of hardware, Sloman concludes by analogy that high level cognitive processes too need not be "reduced" to some low level, primitive human faculties. In fact, those saUle high level processes could be conceived and understood at their own level, even if they were somehow able to run on alternative hardware. 6 What Sloman neglects to consider, however, is that even though high level programs can be conceivably run on "any" hardware, they can only run in practice on some hardware or other. That is, just as compilers are needed in computers to reduce the language of the high level package to the particular machine language capabilities which are available, so too is work such as Carnap's Itecessary to show that human cognitive processes can be "compiled" down to the primitive capabilities of the human "hardware". The Aufbau primitives model the effects of operation of what Pylyshyn might ca11 the "functional architecture" of the human machine,7 while Carnap's constructional system represents a possible "compiler" which can reduce full-blown human epistemology to that primitive "machine language" via constructions by extensional means. What I hope this paper can contribute is an understanding that such "constructions", to be workable and testable, must be crafted from a structural and a procedural point of view.
THE SYSTEM BASIS
There are two "primitives" in Carnap's constructional system: the basic relation and the basic elements. But the "basic elements"--qua primitive (i.e., non-derived)--are only the arguments which appear in the basic relation. As soon as these elements are grouped into an identifiable class of their own, a constructional step has already been performed. Thus, although from one point of view there are indeed two primitives in the Au fbau system, from another viewpoint we see that it contains only one primitive step: the introduction of "Rs", the "Recollection of Similarity" relation.
By means of the Rs-relation one can order one's experience. Neither Rs without experiential content, nor this "raw experience" without its ordering by Rs, has any meaning or interpretation in this system. Hence section 108 of the Aufbau, which introduces Rs, is in fact concerned with both the system "primitives" named above. Onee Rs is applied over a set of arguments, however, the true process of construction begins.
Section 108, as mentioned, treats of the Rs relation and its emplrlcal properties. Section 109 eonstructs a class of objects, elex, whose members are the prirnitive, basic elements. In section 110, a more general relation than Rs is introduced, Part Similarity, which will in turn be highly useful for generating further objects and relations.
The Basic Relation (Rs) [108] Fictitious Operation: It is not initially supposed that the constructing individual--call her A--knows anything about the structure of the Rs relation. All that is given is a basic relation list, w hich is the exhaustive set of a11 pairs of basic elements which have served for A as arguments in the Rs field: thai is, this list, as a whole, comprises the relation extension of Rs in the experience of A. On this basis the fo11owing operation can be performed:
1.
Suppose that A has amassed the fo11owing basic relation list:
{< 1,5> <2,5> <4,5> <:2, 10> <4,10> <5,6> <5,8> <5,9> <5,10>}
2. Each number in the above list is simply an "arbitrary but determinate" token (108) that designates one argument which has appeared in the Rs-extension during the course of A's experience. This inventory list--consisting solely of the various numbered elements which have been ordered by the Rs relation--is called the basic relation list. It contains the only material which A has available for synthesis.
3. Even at this low level, however, some synthesis is already possible. A is now in a position to begin formulating object descriptions. With the exception of the basic elements (iee., the arguments of the Rs relation), all "objects" in this system are in fact "quasi-objects"--i.e., they are classes which have been constructed. But for all objects, constructed or primitive, one can build up "object descriptions" by adding supplemental entries corresponding to each member of the given object/class.
At present A has the tools at hand--namely, the basic relation list which has been ordered by Rs--to build up object descriptions for the basic elements, by specifying the following supplemental entries for each member of the Rs inventory: 
3.
We call the theorem empirical because A discovers its truth solely by an actual . inspection of her basic relation list data. These data reflect the ordering which Rs has imposed on A's experience. That is, A learns the structure of Rs only by observing the inventory class which it in fact creates.
The Basic Elements (elex)
[109]
Carnap's Construction: elex =df C' Rs Paraphrase:
The class elex is the class of elements which have comprised (for A) the fl eId of the Rs relation.
Explanation of Symbols: Many of Carnap's Principia-style symbols (such as "c' ") are no longer widely used or fanIiliar. Hence each of Carnap's derivations will be 1,ranslated into a "revised notation". These revisions will be given in th!3 form of contextual definitions, so that it becomes more obvious that what Carnap really intends are definitions in use (ioe., definitions which ex plain what one means to say about 0 when one uses the constructed term "0" in a sentence) (39,40). In this instance, the revised version of C'arnap's elex definition can be styled as folIows:
Paraphrase: Both members of any pair list which is formed by applying Rs are called elementary experiences. The class which contains a11 members which appear in ordered pairs of the Rs inventory is the class elex of (all) elementary experiences.
Realistic State of Affairs:
The basic relation is Rs, the recollection of similarity. The arglJments for this relation are taken from the lowestlevel object sphere (cf. 29);, i.e., its member-objects cannot be quasi-objects (which are themselves already constructions from some previous stage of the system). Therefore, its arguments must be considered the basic elemen ts of th e system; and the experiences they represent can be deemed the element1:ry experiences.Fictitious Operation:
1.
A has formed a basic relation list, e.g.:
2. From these data the inventory list for the class elex can now be constructed, Namely, it is the class which contains, as its elements, each unique rnember of the Rs pairlist.
Thus, from (1), we derive:
3. It was shown earlier how to begin an object description based solelyon the data in the Rs pair list. Given the inventory which is illustrated in (1), for example, A could now enter these three supplemental entries for element 7:
Rs(x,7) holds when x is a member of {1,2,3} b) Rs (7,y) holds when y is a member of {8} 
Paraphrase: Two el+~mentary experiences, x and y, are part similar if either (1) the Rs relc::tion holds between x and y, or (2) it holds between y and x, or (3) if "::, " and "y" name the same elementary experience.
Fictitious Operation (for the construction in Revised Notation): A employs the contextual definition to generate the extension for the part-similarity relation. Only elementary experiences are contained in the fields of Ps. Thus, given any two rnembers, x and y, of the class elex, A adds them to the list of Ps members, provided either Rs(x,y) or Rs(y,x) holds between thema Also,~{iven any identical ßlember of the elex inventory, x=y), this pair also (Le., <x,y> = <x,x» is added to the Ps list.
Example:
1)
A has construc t.ed an Rs pair list:
2) The corresponding elex inventory is {1,2,3,5,6}
3) Next, the exhaustive set of possible <x,y> pairs that satisfy [(x e elex) & (y e elex)] is constructed:
4) Of these, the pairs which satisfy Rs(x,y) or Rs(y,x) or (x=y) (and so correspond to Ps) are identified:
{< 1,2> <1,3> <2,5> <3,5> <5,6> <2,1> <3,1 ><5,2> <5,3> <6,5> <1,1> <2,2> <3,3> <5,5> <6,6> } Realistic State of Mfairs: If two elementary experiences, x and y, are related by part sim ilarity, then it follows that some part of the experience x is similar to some part of the experience y; and apart of y is likewise similar to apart of x.
Fictitious Operation (Continued):
Whichever of the above two versions of "fictitious operation" we assurne A has used, A will in any case have now constructed her inventory for the extension of the Ps relation. These data are no\'\' used to create additional supplemental entries for the object descriptions of each Rs-member. Below, I illustrate the three types of supplemental entry which have so far been introduced: Note: These theorems are considered BnBlytic since they follow as a direct consequence of how Ps is constructed. That is, no appeal to actual pair-list data is req uired to confirm them.
That this is so in the case of Theorem 2 becollles especially obvious on inspection of Carnap's construction for Ps which is provided above: If any ordered pair <x,y> is in the extension of Ps (where x is not equal to y), then the pair must also be in either the extension of Rs or of Rs. If in the former, then, by the construction, both <x,y> itself and its converse <y,x> are included by union in the Ps field. If in the latter (i.e., if <x,y> appears not in the Rs-list but in the extension of its converse relation, Rs), then it follows that <y,x> must have occurred as a mem ber-pair in the original Rs inventory. Once again, both orderings of the <x,y> pair will be included in the Ps list by union. In either case, we see that a symmetrical structure for the Ps list is insured.
That Ps is reflexive is likewise analytic, based on the Ps-constructions. Both versions alike simply declBre, in their respective notations, that, given any member x of the elex class, its identical pair, <x,x>, is included in the Ps inventory. This makes the latter reflexive in structure.
THE STRlJCTURE OF SIMILARITY CIRCLES
In Carnap's system, the elementary experiences are non-constructed objects at the lowest possible level; for they are merely the primitive arguments for the basic relation. Once "elex" has been constructed as a class or concept, however, each individual elex (i.e., each elex member) can next be assigned a number of properties (such as membership in elex and part similarity to other specific elex's) by means of supplemental entries.
In the remainder of this paper, we will explore in some detail the construction of the next, higher level set of objects in Carnap's system, the Similarity Circles. Although a constructed class, a "similcirc" (i.e., a similarity circle) is still very primitive as compared with, say, a constructed phenomenal quality such as "red-in-color" or "rough-in-texture". Indeed, the nature of similarity circles can be scarcely comprehended by our (usual) intuitions.
To imagine what sort of entity a similarity circle is, one might attempt the following experiment: Open and shut your eyes very quickly and recall to yourself everything you saw, feIt, heard, slllelled, and tasted in that instant when your eyes were open. (Try, as much as possible, to forget your names for things and to attend just to the impressions of color, texture, and so on.) Next, group together, with this expe-rience, all your ima,l{es for every other such experience in which something was similar to that last one (whether in taste, smell, touch, sound, or appearance)--ancl include a11 aspects of those images (Le., also include the parts whlch are not similar to the image being cornpared). If you can imagine the collectivity of all those impressions--which is, in practice, unlikely--you are roughly picturing to yourself a single "similarity circle".
In this section, we take a close look at the structural description of a constructed similarity circle. Nelson Goodman's classic counter exampIe to Carnap's cOJistruction will be introduced, as weIl an alternative derivation which ap pears to bypass that objection. Discussion of a procedural complement to these descriptive nlodels will be reserved for the section following.
Similarity Circles (similcirc )
[111]
Carnap's Construction: similcirc =df Simili Ps
Paraphrase: Similc rc is a class of classes, whose member-classes are just those "similarit.y circles" which can be derived by quasi-analysis based on the Part-E imilarity relation.
Explanation:
Earlier in his text, Carnap has elaborated a concept of "quasi-analysis" in some detail. (See, especially, his sections 70-72 and 80.) He has hoped to make clear how by using a symrnetrical and reflexive relation--such :tS Ps--the classes called "similarity circles" can be constructed. Hence, similcirc is nqw sinlply defined as being that class which is comprised of a11 similarity circles which can be generated by such quasi-analysis based on Ps.
Although earl Lap is not explicit in this section on how his construction "Simili PS'1 should be interpreted, his guidelines from those earlier-mentioned discussions can be used to get a clear picture of his intentions. My own interpretation follows this note, under the heading "Revised Notation". In keeping with the preference of this paper, it is presented as a contextual definition. 8 Revised Notation: a e simileire =df
Similclrc is a class of classes. For any given class, a, to meet the conditions for membership in similcirc, the following must hold true of it:
1)
All its menLbers ruust be elementary experiences; and 2) Any elementary experience, u, which is such that a11 members of aare part-similar to that experience (u) must be itself a member of a; and 3) All elex-pairs (distinct or identical) which are members of a must be part-~dmilar to each other.
Notas:
According to this construction, similcirc is precisely defined in terms of previously constructed objects, the basic elements, and the traditional symbols and operations of modern logic.
2.
The construction puts forward three main conditions for membership of a class 0 in the class of all similarity circles; and these requirements closely correspond to Carnap's own natural-Ianguage definition for similcircs, which he provides in his section 80 (bracketed numbers added):
Thus, by tsimilarity circles' we understand those classes of elementary experiences which have the following two properties: (1) any two elementary experiences of such a class are part similar to one another (Ps); (2) if an elementary experience is part similar to all elementary experiences in such a class, then it belongs itself to that class.
Compare the paraphrase for the present construction:
1)
Carnap's condition (1) appears as the present condition
Carnap's condition (2) corresponds to the present condition (2); and
3)
The present condition (1) is presupposed when Carnap states that his own two conditions are applied to classes of elementary experiences.
3.
Historically, one of the most influential criticisms of Carnap's Aufbau was published by Nelson Goodman in his own Structure of Appearance. Goodman's objections to Carnap's construction of Similarity Circles struck at the very foundation of Carnap's system; yet they clearly assumed an interpretation of Carnap's simileire construction such as that presented in my "revised notation". If it is possible that similcircs could be constructed differently, then their derivation might conceivably escape the force of Goodman's arguments.
In brief, GoodInan's objection to the construction hinges primarily on the problem of what he caUs "imperfect community". This is the situation which is said to apply when elex's can be joined into apparent similarity circles (based on the revised construction), and yet, "in fact", there is no single respect in which all alike are similar. This becomes possible, it is said, just when every given pair of elements in the faulty circle is similar--with respect to same quasi-constituent, but yet the constituent with respect to which this similarity occurs is different for different pairs of elementH. Thus, when such "imperfect community" obtains between elements, the process which is thought to be a construction of true similarity circles is, in fact, a misleading grouping into one class of experiences which share no one common similarity.
It is to illustrate this problem that Goodman introduces his weIl known counter example to Carnap's construction of similcirc. Following Carnaptls own lead (70), he simplifies the presentation of his example by the use of an analogy: Instead of speaking of "elementary experiences" having "quasi-constituents" with respect to which the elex's might be "part similar", the analogy substitutes "objects" which have "colors" which can be "the same". Hence, Goodman's example:
1. bg 2. rg 3. br 4. r 5. b 6. g (The numbers indic'ite objects (elex's), and the letters refer to their respective colors (quasi-constituents).) Such a set of objects forms the counter example to Carnap, according to Goodman, for this reason: If the objects 1, 2, and 3 are grouped into a single class, the class thus formed appears to satisfy the conditions for simil!~irc class-membership. It does so, he claims, precisely in virtue of the 'imperfect community" of its members. That is, each pair within {1,2,3} does indeed share same common color--yet no one color is in fact shb,.red eommonly by a11 the objects. Clearly this defeats the purpose of the construction.
It is obvious that Carnap intended his "Simil' Ps" construction of similcirc to be takf'n as logically equivalent to what I presented previously in my reviserl notation. If this is the case, then his system is indeed vulnerable to the weight of Goodman's counter example. For instance, let a be the set of elex's {1,2,3} corresponding to Goodlnan's counter example (w here the constructional terminology is used in place of the color/object analogy). Since all its members are defined as elex's, condition (1) of the derivation is met. Since any elex whieh is part-similar to a11 the class members is itself a elass member, condition (2) is also satisfied. Finally, condition (3) is fulfilled, since a11 a's memberpairs are part-similar. Thus a set whose members share only an "imperfect community" sef~ms able, nonetheless, to pass the logical tests given by Carnap to comprise a similarity cirele.
However, it is possible to construct alternative derivations for simileire. The alter !lative presented below remains faithful, I believe, to Carnap's primary intentions for "Simil''', but yet avoids at least some of the difficulties which Goodman points out.
Alternative Construction: Cl e simileire =df (e)[(e e Cl) -+ (e e elex)]
Paraphrase: Similcirc is a class of classes. For any given class, a, to meet the conditions for membership in simileire, the following must hold true of it:
1) All its members must be elementary experiences; 2)
Any elementary experience, u, which is such that all members of 0 are part-similar to that experience (u) must be itself a member of ol;
3)
All elex-pairs (distinct or identical) which are members of Cl must be part-sinlilar to each other; and 4)
There must be at least one elex, y, which is a member of ol, and for which it holds that any elex at all which is part-similar to y is also an element of Cl.
Notes: At the very least, this version does escape the trap posed by Goodman's specific counter example. It does so by adding a fourth criterion for a class's membership in similcirc. Unfortunately, there exist still other cases where even this third construction is insufficient.
In the next section of this paper we will see how our design of a procedural model for simile ire construction can guide our selection of an appropriate logical derivation for the class. But for now we will rest our analysis on some sampIe cases, and consider only structural criteria. The object/elex analogy will be maintained. Note on Example 1: The alternative construction (D2) has successfully elirrIinated class [4] from the simileire list. Carnap's Version (D 1) had allowed it to enter simileire based on the "imperfeet community" of its members; and this had formed the basis for Goodrrlan's complaint. D2 is able (correctly) to reject it from simileire on account of its added fourth condition.
Note that eBch mernber of D1's class [4] shares a color with (Le., is part-similar to) at least one non-member of the class. That is, there is not at least one member which does not forrn the Ps-relation to any non-class-member. Thus that class does not conform to the requirements of D2. Note on Example 2: This example clearIy illustrates the conservative nature of constructio ,:} D2 as compared with D1. In fact, this author contends, D2 will neVf r accept a class as being a valid similcirc which D1 would rightly reject. But the price which is paid for this added tightness of constructic,n is that D2 will often reject valid--as weIl as invalid--classes from similcirc which D1 would have accepted. This is the case in the present example.
Speaking in what Carnap would call the ttrealistic Ianguage", we might say that class [1] in this instance corresponds to "blue" (Le., its membership consist S of all and only objects containing bIue), class [2] corresponds to "red", class [3] corresponds to "green", and class [4] corresponds to "yellow"; while only class [5] is improperly formed on the basis of an iml'erfect community. (That is, there is no quasi-constituent in virtue of w'hich all members of {1,2,3} are actually part-similar.) Nonetheless, all 5 of. these classes are affirmed by D1 to form valid similcircs. The alternaLive construction, D2, has correctly rejected class [5] from similcirc; but, in the process, it has also passed over the legitimate classes [2] to [4], because none of these satisfy its fourth condition. This last example shows that construction D2, though conservativn, can nonetheless also generate false similcircs under certain circumstancl~s. Once again, this can be accounted for by an "imperfeet community" among the pseudo-class's members. (This could also occur on account cf a constant companionship of dissimilar qualities in tho same objects---a contingency which Carnap hirnself acknowledges (70).) Still, it is significant that whenever such instances occur, construction Dl would also generate the same improper sirrdlcircs. Hence, if one's aim is to minimize the construction of false classes (while allowing for the risk that, pending the acquisition of further data, some legitimate classes might be rejected), D2 is preferable. Yet D1 has the reverse advantage of accepting true sinlilcircs more readily--but at the greater risk of falsely accepting improper sets.
Realistie State of Affairs (This is intended to apply regardless of whieh derivation for simileire is ultimately aeeepted):
All elementary experiences contain a wide array of qualities. If a quality which appears in one such elex is s llfficiently similar to a quality appearing in another, then the two elex's involved can be said to be part-sindlar. The construction of similcirc-classes is the attempt to identify those qualityclusters with respel:;t to which the various elex's might be deemed to be similar.
Several possible constructions have been offe:ted far these similarity-groupings. Their common intent is to insure that:
no elex is excluded from a similcirc if it contains a quality from just that quality-cluster which the derived similcirc is designed to represent; and no elex is included in a siIllilcirc if it fails to contain a quality from just that quality-cluster which the similcirc is designed to represent. Eaeh of the above construetions must ultimately be judged by how well it can insure that these two intended conditions (in the realistic language) will obtain.
FICTITIOUS OPERATIONS FOR SIMILCIRC CONSTRUCTION
Similarity circles, I have said, are the first constructed objeets in Carnap's system beyond the class of elementary experienees. All su bsequent objects depend--directly or indirectly--on these for their derivation. Henee the details of this similcirc construction are espeeially important for testing the vitality and overall viability of the proposed constructional system. Following Carnap's indications in his text, I have atteIllpted to expand upon his "Simili Ps" construction of simileire; that is, I have tried to make explicit, in my "revised notation", the logical specifications which Carnap intends for his constructed sirnilcire classes. But does the formulation of these logical rules for class definition eonstitute, at the same tirne, a procedural basis for that class's construction? Carnap clearly seems to believe that it does. While he acknowledges the heuristic and didactic advantages of appending the fictitious operations to the formal constructions--to help ascertain "that the (constructions are) purely extensional"--he firrnly believes "that the constructianal system itself has nathing ta da with these fictians" (99).
If I am correct, however, in the view expressed in this paper's introduction, than a defensible construction for human cognitive processes and faculties must be able to stand on bath logical and procedural grounds. Acceptance of this position demands that one be vigilant to insure that both approaches remain always in harmony. By studying below some "fictitious operations" for Carnap's similcirc construction, I hope to show both the irnportance and the diffieulty involved in such vigilance.
CARNAP'S "FIRST PASS": THE ANALOGY OF PROPER ANALYSIS
In effect, Carnap provides a first approach at a procedural representation of simileire construction in Seetion 70 of his text. Here he describes the possibility for an analysis, properly so ealled, of a set of colored objects into classes of those objects which are similarly eolored. This could be done, he says, without reference to the objects' intensional properties of being red or green or blue, ete. Instead, provided only one knows which pairs of these objects are "color akin" (i.e., share a eommon color), one could group them by extensional rIlethods into classes corresponding to their shared colors.
Moreover, he suggests that these same extensional procedures which are used in proper analysis, just described, can be applied as weIl for the proce:~s of simileire construction; for the latter process can be viewed as a "( uasi-analysis" of elementary experiences into classes corresponding to ',heir quasi-constituent "clusters" of similar qualities. In short, the imagery of proper analysis is eIIlployed as a model, or "fictitious" operation, for the procedures of simileire construction.
So far, then, the imagery Carnap employs in Section 70 appears potentially quite helpful. However, in presenting his model, he makes a naive assumption, w hich I take to express his general view: He treats the procedure (in this case, of proper analysis) as merely involving the successive applicat Lon--in some undefined manner--of his forInal, logical rules. But how are these rules to be employed, and in what order is this succession of applieations to occur? These questions are passed over as if of no o)nsequence. That is, having presented the formal defining characteristics of a constructed similarity circle (elaborated in this text in Note 2 for the construction in revised notation)9, Carnap merely states that "the classes forrned in this way will be the [similarity circles]". In actuality no "way" (in the sense of a genuine method or proced ure) has re l:tlly been expressed at all. All he does is refer the reader back to the "two [logical] properties" said to characterize a properly formed slrnilarity circle (70).
CARNAP'S "SECOND PASS": A FICTITIOUS OPERATION
Carnap's "fiJ st pass" procedure for constructing sirnileire appears in the preliminary sections of his Aufbau. In Section 111, where the similcirc derivation enters the formal constructional outline, Carnap introduces a more spe( ific Fictitious Operation for its generation. The proposed algorithm, 1 nfortunately, is deficient not only because it yields classes that are s lbject to Nelson Goodman's objections,lO but also because the algorithn is rather ambiguous as to the intended Inechanism for terminating tht, construction. In short, it is difficult to know exactly what the procedul e generates and whether these results are satisfactory.
To conserve space, I will not elaborate this second algorithIIl in full detail. It is sufficient, I believe, to characterize it as a method for transforIuing the constructor's initial inventory of part similar elex-pairs into ever larger classes of mutually part similar members. This much insures that all resultant classes meet Carnap's first condition for sirnileire construction. By "erasing" from this set of (tentatively) constructed classes all su bsumed su belasses, Carnap further appears to satisfy the condition that the resultant classes by "as large as possible".
Yet it is open to question how exactly Carnap's procedure should be terminated. If only the largest classes are retained, the probabilities for accepting false classes (such as in Goodman's counter example) turn out to be considerably reduced (though many valid classes mayaIso be rejected in the process). If, on the other hand, one follows the more likely reading of Carnap's text, i.e., that a11 non-"erased" classes should be retained, then Carnap clearly does open hirnself to Goodman's objections; since his method would readily permit construction of Goodmantype false classes. Either way, it seelns that Carnap did not seriously work through his own recommended procedures, nor did he recognize the disparity between (1) the set of classes these procedures generate, vs. (2) the set of classes which would (independently) happen to meet the structural conditions imposed by his logic.
NELSON GOODMAN'S EXTRAPOLATIONS:
In Nelson Goodman's commentary on the Aufbau (in the Structure of Appearance) he provides a service to Carnap readers by actua11y trying to work out some consequences of attempting to generate Carnapstyle classes. For instance, he offers a procedural algorithm to accompany Carnap's analogy of proper analysis for similcirc generation. AIthough Goodman does not acknowledge this explicitly, the algorithm he offers is clearly of his own invention. It differs from both of Carnap's alternatives which I have set out above. (Goodman describes himself as "amplifying" Carnap's exposition, rather than as adding to its substance. l l ) Unfortunately, like Carnap, Goodman offers only an incomplete description of the proced ures he envisions.
Following Carnap's image of proper analysis involving colored objects, Goodman gives an example of six such objects, shown below.
1. br 2. b 3. bg   TABLE I 4. g 5. r 6. bgr
The color-kinship pair list for this example's object set would thus eonsist of the following (symmetrical) pairs:
(1,1)(1,2)(1,3)(1,5)(1,6) (2,2)(2,3)(2,6)(3,3)(3,4)(3,6) (4,4) (4,6) (5,5) (5,6) (6,6)
TABLE 11
The problem which is posed for the constructional algorithm is this: How can A work from only the pair list of Table 11 to derive the original objeet set (of Table I ) as output? Below is quoted Goodnlan's attempted solution. In his view, the method which follows would accord with Carnap's own directives. 12 The rules for accornplishing the [analysis] are: (A) Eaeh class must be such that every pair of members of the class is listed in [ Table 11 ]. (B) Each class must be such that no thing that is not a mernber is paired [by that table] with a11 the members; that is, each elass rnust be a greatest possible class satisfying rule A.
Proceeding to apply these proposed rules, we may commence by listing all the things paired with thing 1 by [ Table 11 , iee., by color kinf3hip]. These are 1,2,3,5,6. But the class {I 2 3 5 6} breaks rule A since pairs 2:5 and 3:5 are not listed in [Table 11 ]. Hence we must drop either 5 alone 01' both 2 an j 3 if we are to have a color class. Dropping 5, we have left the class {I 2 3 6}. This satisfies the two requirernents: A) every pair in it is listed in [ Table 11 ]; (B) nothing excluded (Le., 4 01' 5) is paired by the table with every member of the class, since pairs 3:5 and 1:4, for example, are nl)t on the list. The class {I 2 3 6} we therefore label "kl".
To COI struct a second class we may drop from the preliminary class first suggested ({ 1 2 3 5 6}) numbers 2 and 3 instead of number 5. This leaves us with the class {I 56}, which Hatisfies both rules and which we may call "k2".
A third color class may be found by listing, say, a11 the things paired with 3.
Furthe r investigation will reveal no fourth class answering the two requirements. [k3 is {3 4 6}.] Now . . . let us glance back at [ Table T] . We see that kl includes a11 and only b-things; that k2 includes a11 and only r-things; and k3 a11 and only g-things. Thus our rules have enabled us to discover these true color classes on the basis of a ll.st which told us merely what pairs comprised two things having some unit in common.
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One's first impression on inspeeting a11 this detail is that Goodman must have indeed set out a complete procedure. A begins by constructing a preliminary class for object 1; and then refines this by cutting out just so many members as will permit the resultant class to satisfy the rules for simil 'lrity circles. Since this can be perforilled in two distinct ways, there Hre two distinct circles which result from the analysis of the first preHml nary class.
So far, Goodman's method seems quite effective. Yet why does he skip immediately from consideration of preliminary class 1 to the preliminary class corres ponding to the object 3? No dou bt, he has realized that object 2 belongs to no true color class beyond that which has already been generated as kl. But A (the constructor) cannot know this prior to completing: the derivation. Surely, a proper algorithm must permit a preliminary class to be constructed for every object which appears in a color akin pair. If the resultant similarity circles formed are duplications of alroady constructed classes, the procedures must also be able to recognize this, and to assign a common "tag" to these redundantly generated c lasses.
More revealing of Goodman's perspective is his almost cavalier suggestion that a third class may be found "by listing, say, a11 the things paired with 3". His use of the terIfl "say" surely implies that, for hirn, it is a matter of indifference in what order the preliminary classes are taken. Now the reader may at first object that this is no criticism of Goodman's methode After all, it might be argued, any method which ca11s for testing a11 possible subsets of the experienced object set against the similarity circle formation rules would eventually accept or reject the same classes as validated similcircs. Therefore, why should it not be a matter of indiffer!~nce (as it is for Goodman) in just what order the testing is performed? The response of this paper is that there are alternative procedures in which not a11 possible subsets of the total list of objects would be considered for further testing. In short, it is imperative that one specify exactly just what sorts of preliminary classes will be evaluated, since not a11 conceivable methods will in fact generate the identical sets of output classes.
This last point reoccurs in regard to Goodman's counter example to Carnap's definition. As detailed previously, Goodman posits a set of six objects to be constructed. Then he asks us to "suppose" that " . . . someone suggests that things 1, 2, 3 constitute a color class". 13 The case is taken to refute Carnap's derivation since the specified set meets a11 formal conditions for similcirc membership, and yet does so only because of its members' so-called "imperfect community".
But why should we presume that the false class {I 2 3} could be deemed "constructed" simply because "someone suggests" as much? Obviously, if Goodman thinks this is viable, it is because he assumes that, inevitably, all the logical possibilities will be considered anyway. In the algorithm which follows, however, that very premiss is overturned. That is, while only classes which satisfy Carnap's formal conditions are generated by the method, not a11 possible permutations of object lists are considered. In fact, Goodman's set of objects stands as an example--not as a counter example--if the upcoming method is employed.
AN ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTIONAL ALGORITHM (WITH A COMPlJTER IMPLEMENTATION):
Historically, the algorithm presented here was developed as part of a project to design a computer implementation of Carnap's similcirc construction. 14 Once again, Carnap's analogy of similcirc construction with proper analysis of colored objects is employed. I shall first present the algorithm itself in five steps.
The Algorithm
Input of Pair List Data
For both Carnap and Goodman, the input data for similcirc construction consist of a pair list extension. For true similcirc generation the pairs would be those elex's which are related by part sirrdlarity. In the analogy with proper analysis, we can speak of the pairs of objects related by sharing sorrle corrlmon color (i.e., by "color kinship").
Determination of the TCLASSes:
What are here called "tentative color classes" or "TCLASSes" correspond to what Goodman denotes as "preliminary classes" in his own extrapolation (see above). These are the classes which are to be further tested with regard to their possible eligibility as true color classes (or similcircs). Just as Goodman implies (though he does not specify) that there is to be a preliminary class corresponding to each given object, the present method will posit a TCLASS for each object.
The basis fo'" determining the TCLASSes ean be forInalized, as follows:
1)
Given n ,)bjects, there should be n TCLASSes forIned.
2)
Each TCLASSi consists of the object i together with a11 other objects which have "kinship" with i.
This part of the algorithm is designed to satisfy Carnap's second criterion for sirrdlarity circle membership. Since each object is postulated to belong to every possible TCLASS for which it has kinship with the first member, this ensures that no object could have kinship with every object in a color c Lass and yet faH to belong to that class.
Proof:
1)
Suppose the i'th TCLASS happens to be a true color class which corresponds to some commonly held color C.
2)
Suppose further that object 0, which also contains color c, is color akin to a11 members of TCLASSi.
3)
But if 0 is akin to all TCLASSi members, then it must of course be akin as well to the first member, 'object i.
4)
By the present procedure, therefore, o's membership in TCLASSi is insured; because all objects which are akin to object will be included in TCLASSi.
5)
Hence, it has been shown that any object 0 which has kinship 1,0 all the objects in a true color class will be included (as per Carnap's directive) in that class.
3. Determination 01' Non-Akin Pairs:
The next broad task is to determine which TCLASSes are true color classes. The non-akin pairs just referred to are those couplets of objects which da not share color kinship. Accordingly, since a11 members of a true color class are color akin, these non-akin pairs are couplets which will not be found among the members of a true color class. That is, by first deternlining the set of such non-akin pairs, a basis for rejecting TCLASSes will be made available.
Determination 01' True Color Classes:
If all TCLASSes which contain non-akin pairs are rejected, then those which remain are the true color classes (or similcircs). This preserves Carnap's first condition for similarity circle membership, according to which all pairs of members of a true color class must be color akin.
Constructing the Analyzed Object Set:
The model is complete once the set of true color classes is used to construct the corresponding set of objects whose color constituents have been identifi'3d.
Justifying the Algorithm WILLIAM M. GOODMAN
It is clear that, if this algorithm were used in place of Nelson Goodman's, Goodman's counter example would lose its force. The only TCLASSes which would contain a11 three of objects {I, 2, 3} would be TCLASSI ({I 2 3 56}), TCLASS2 ({2 I 3 4 6}), and TCLASS3 ({3 I 2 4 5} ). No class {I 2 3} would ever be formed using my algorithm.
The question remains, however, whether this algorithm can be identified with what Carnap himself intended by similcirc "construction". This author believes that it can be; for Carnap's system represents a dynamic and selective process of class generation, rather than a mere analysis of a11 10gica11y possible sets.
From this perspective, one must look at a detail of Carnap's own presentation which seems to be easily overlooked. In his own words, the second criterion for color class construction is this: The color "classes are the largest possible classes a11 of whose members are color-akin (Le., there is no thing outside a color class which stands in the relation of color kinship to an the things in the class" (70). The second, parenthetical part of this definition, it is true, is expressed negatively, and does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting spurious TCLASSes along the lines of Goodman's counter example. But considered as a whole, the criterion provides a strong sense of how these TCLASSes might be constructed. Namely,
I)
From the point of view of any object, it should not be left out of any TCLASS to which it could possibly belong.
2)
From the point of view of any TCLASS, it should not exclude any object that could possibly belong to it.
The algorithm of this section, it is feIt, accords with this clear sense from Carnap's text. Since the emphasis of Carnap's Section 70 is indisputably on the generation of the "largest possible classes . . .", there is no obvious necessity to generate and test every logically possible combination of objects (such as Goodman's problematic class {I 2 3}) and to subject these to further scrutiny. It is sufficient if the procedures for deriving the "largest possible classes.
"can insure that the resulting classes meet Carnap's logical criteria.
THE COMPlJTER PROGRAM The algorithm described above has been embodied in a computer program, written in the Logo progranlming language as implemented by Terrapin for the Apple 11 computer. "Logo" names a high level language that was originally developed for use in an educational context. It is a highly structured language and designed to further the construction and recursive enlployment of function-like routines called "procedures".
There is, unfortunately, not the space in this article to present the full listing of my program, 15 or to detail all its speeific features. Nonetheless, the guiding outline for the program has already been given in terms of the six-point algorithm which I have described.
The only :inl ut for the program which has theoretical significance consists of a Carrl :lp-style inventory (calIed the PAIRLIST) of a11 known pairs of color-aki 11 objects (or, if applied to quasi-, rather than to proper, analysis, of a11 parts of Part Similar elex's). In principle, since each abject in the PAIRLIST is indicated there by a nUßlerical token, the computer itself could have been programmed to calculate automatica11y the number of distinct objects to be constructed from the pairing found in the input invf'ntory. Also, a random sequence of arbitrary class names could be computer-generated, if needed, to identify a11 TCLASSes being constructed by the procedure. However, to simplify the programming task and to conserve system memory, I in fact wrote the program to accept as secondary inputs (1) the number of distinct objects represented in the PAIHLIST, and (2) a corresponding list of TCLASS nalnes (such as "Tl", T2
t1 , and so on).
After these data have been input, the program executes the fivestep algarithm. Part I of the procedure runs until it has printed (1) the initial PAIRLIST dHta; (2) the exhaustive list of a11 TCLASSes which can be formed from that data; (3) the list of a11 "non-akin pairs"16 of objects; and, finally, (4) the "token" nUßlbers of a11 objects whose TCLASSes have tu rned out to be valid color classes (or similcircs) according to the algorithm.
The second stage of the program 17 uses the outputs just described to construct the object set into which the original input data pair list can be "analyzed". First, for convenience, the computer operator is asked to provide appropriate names for the colors (similcircs) which have just been identified. Then the program concludes by connecting each object with the names of a11 those validated TCLASSes to which that object belongs. That is, in the "realistic language", the program analyzes each object into its constituent colors. I illustrate below a crucial "run" of the program which has just been outlined. For input, I use just that pair list inventory which corresponds to the data set for Nelson Goodman's counter example to Carnap's similcirc construction. Observe how the program is able correct1y to analyze the data given, that is, to "construct" from these date precisely--and only--those "objects" which are presupposed by the example case. (Goodman, of course, had said that this could not be achieved in this instance.) Reca11 that the object set represented by the pair list (i.e., which must be constructed on the basis of that list) is as shown: The immediate eontention of this paper is that the "fietitious operation" just given for simile ire construetion (in the form of a programmable algorithm) is more dependable than that whieh is provided by either Carnap 01' Nelson Goodman. That is, the above algorithm will more often yield resultant classes whieh eonform both to Carnap's logieal eriteria and to our own intuitions. The program run for Goodman's "problem ease" is a strang argument in favor of this elairn; sinee the proeedures have correct1y analyzed the presumed objeet set.
But it does not follow that a successful algorithm eannot be represented both lc,gically and strueturally. To the contrary, the "alternative" constr~uction for sirnileire whieh I proposed earlier includes an additional logical requirement for simileire class membership--beyond the provisos already requjred by Carnap. This eondition (that at least one member of a true color class must have kinship only with fellow members of that class) was added upon my discovery, while running the above program, that all aceeptable classes which the program generates inevitably eontain this added struetural feature.
Indeed, it can easily be proved that this new logical condition must apply to all classes generated by the computer program. Every confirmed color class (or similcirc) must be--according to the procedural rules--a TCLASS for (at least) one of the objects. Suppose that one of these confirmed color classes is TCLASSi. According to the rules, TCLASSi must contain a11 other objects which have kinship with the specifie object i. That is, there is no thing outside of TCLASSi which has kinship with thing i. Therefore, for that color whose extension is TCLASSi, object i must be that object which satisfies the added proviso in the construction--i.e., the object which has kinship only with fellow class members.
In effect, then, I have reversed the sequence of procedure elaboration and class definition used apparently by Carnap and Goodman. These thinkers hold that the logical structure of the desired output classes can be used also as a testing mechanism in the fictitious operation. That is, one generates all possible object sets (in SOIne indifferent order) and merely tests which of these accord with the desired class's formal definition. In the preceding section, however, the eIIlphasis was on making the "fictitious" operations subject to practical testing--via a computer simulation. In this process it was discovered that it was not necessary--indeed, it was desirable not to--construct a11 possible sets of objects, but rather to generate an ordered sequence of sets. Then, once these procedures were in place, I later reconsidered the logical structure of the actual output classes, with a view to discovering in these some unexpected new properties--conditions to be added to a refined descriptive model.
It would be equally mistaken, however, to advance the opposite thesis, that proced ural modeling must always precede structural modeling in epistemological inquiry. Rather, I believe that both modeling techniques must go hand in hand, with the real test being whether one can construct a consistent, complementary pair of models--one procedural and one descriptive--which jointly comprise a proposed construction. I contend that Carnap's employment of the "fictitious operation" device represents a first step towards realizing the importance of joint descriptive/procedural modeling. In this paper, I have used Carnap's work essentia11y as a case study, in order to clarify the relation between these two modes of modeling, as weIl as to emphasize the importance of taking both seriously. It is hoped that this effort can contribute both to an increased understanding of Carnap's writings and to a greater insight on the potential use of complementary modeling techniques in epistemological (and other) research. 
